A survey of early work exploring how AI can be used in medicine, with somewhat more technical expositions than in the complementary volume Artificial Intelligence in Medicine."Each chapter is preceded by a brief introduction that outlines our view of its contribution to the field, the reason it was selected for inclusion in this volume, an overview of its content, and a discussion of how the work evolved after the article appeared and how it relates to other chapters in the book.

This book has been adapted in large part from the author's doctoral thesis [Shortliffe, l 974b]. Portions of the work appeared previously in Computers And Biomedical Research [Shortliffe, 1973, l 975b], Mathematical Biosciences [Shortliffe, 1975a], and the Proceedings Of The Thirteenth San Diego Biomedical Symposium [Shortliffe, l 974a]. To Stanford's Medical Scientist Training Program, which is supported by the National Institutes of Health Contents

JANICE S. AIKINS Dr. Aikins received her Ph.D. in computer science from Stanford University in 1980. She is currently a research computer scientist at IBM's Palo Alto Scientific Center. She specializes in designing systems with an emphasis on the explicit representation of control knowledge in expert systems. ROBERT L. BLUM Dr. Blum received his M.D. from the University of California Medical School at San Francisco in 1973. From 1973 to 1976 he did an internship and residency in the Department of Internal Medicine at the Kaiser Foundation Hospital in Oakland, California, where he was chief resident in 1976.

Edward H. Shortliffe Chapter 6 Details of the Revised Therapy Algorithm

I am quite ready to subscribe to the already mentioned slogan that "whatever a human being can do,an appropriate machine can do, too"; but I do this only because.I regard the slogan as utterly trivial. At the moment, I am not talking about what maohines could do in principle but only about what actually existing or blueprinted machines could do, and it Is with regard to these that I utter my definite opinions. If someone wishes to write sciencefiction about information-processing centres of the (undetermined) future, let him do so and I shall discuss it with him over a glass of beer and even offer some startling suggestions of my own. If he is interested in improving the literature search process today, I would strongly advise him to forget about mechanizing abstracting or indexing. May I add that it is with a good amount of sorrow that I have come to this conclusion which is quite counter, to my temperament and my convictions (never published) of a few years ago.

An unsophisticated translation of such a sentence will therefore not be a good translation. Again, contrary to Mr. Richensi opinion, I believe that the problem involved is serious. There is no simple procedure to find out which, and in what way, the words of the English language are context-dependent. And I don't think that the issue can be belittled for tae reason that contextdependent words do not occur in scientific discussions and writings. They might not be too abundant in ordinary scientific papers on matters physical or chemical, but there would surely be plenty of them in discussions of matters linguistic, for instance. This might be one reason why so far hardly anybody has tried to machine translate papers in linguistics. As soon as this is attempted, the seriousness of the problem will become immediately evident.

Biology seems to be a science in its own right, or set of sciences having common aims, and so it should have its own language and explanatory concepts; yet when any specifically biological concept is suggested and used as an explanatory concept it seems to be unsatisfactory and even mystical. There are many biological concepts of this kind: Purpose, Drive, elan vital, Entelechy, Gestalten.* Physicists and engineers seem, on the other hand, to have clearly defined concepts having great power within biology.

If ability to perform complex calculations were a sufficient criterion, then even a conventional digital computor could lay claim to more intelligence than any of usand perhaps we had better let it make away with the word and be done with it.

We discuss several aspects of legal arguments, primarily arguments about the meaning of statutes. First, we discuss how the requirements of argument guide the specification and selection of supporting cases and how an existing case base influences argument formation.

We focus on realistic, complex domains where the concepts, terms and predicates used by domain rules or by rule-based models are not well-defined. Often, in such inherently ill-defined domains the rules do not encompass all the situations they are asked or assumed to cover, admit tacit exceptions, or can be contradicted and annulled by other rules. Interpretation is therefore required of the terms and predicates used. The law is a prototypical example of such an area, where terms used in legal statutes are not completely defined by legal regulations. The use of case-based reasoning (CBR) to complement and supplement other types of reasoning involves many computational questions of system architecture and control. The key focus of this work is how and when to interleave CBR with other modes of reasoning in the context of applying a rule or model to a new set of facts in light of a corpus of cases of past application. The goal is to generate an explanation or argument as to how the new fact situation might be interpreted. In particular, we report on a system called CABARET (CAse-BAsed REasoning Tool), a hybrid architecture we have built to study and experiment with these issues.